This paper investigates whether economic uncertainty induces a postponement of family formation. We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel which provides longitudinal information of economic uncertainty and fertility for the period 1984 to 2004. We employ 'objective' measures of uncertainty (unemployment, fixed-term contract, low income) as well as 'subjective' measures (the feeling that the personal economic situation is insecure). Our results suggest that there is no clear indication that economic uncertainty generally leads to a postponement of parenthood. More highly educated women tend to postpone family formation when unemployed or when they feel insecure about their personal economic situation. However, women with low educational levels accommodate themselves quite readily with motherhood when subject to labor market insecurities.
Introduction
Over the last decades, most European countries have witnessed a dramatic shift of childbearing to older ages. This development is one of the most significant demographic changes that Western industrialized countries have been experiencing. The increase in the age at childbirth plays a significant role in the decline of annual fertility rates. It has also become evident that the delay in family formation is the prime cause of the recent fertility decline in Southern and Eastern Europe (Bongaarts 1999: 256; Sobotka 2004) . Fertility delay has long-term consequences for completed fertility, given that a late age at first birth reduces the chances of having any further children (Marini and Hodson 1981; Morgan and Rindfuss 1999 ).
Women's education, employment and career orientation have been identified as chief parameters for the increase in the age at childbirth (Rindfuss et al. 1996; Martin 2000; Gustafsson 2001 ). In more recent publications, it has been stipulated that youth Blossfeld et al. 2005) . Economic uncertainty is also regarded to be among the main driving forces behind the fertility postponement and the unprecedented decline in period fertility rates which occurred all over Eastern Europe after the demise of the communist systems (Eberstadt 1994; Witte and Wagner 1995; Adler 1997; Ranjan 1999; Kharkova and Andreev 2000) . The delay in family formation may thus reflect growing uncertainty about the economic future that individuals in contemporary societies face.
However, little empirical evidence exists on the relationship between economic uncertainty and fertility. On the macro level, sudden economic downswings have left their clear imprint on annual fertility rates. The Great Depression is an example, where a sudden increase in unemployment was followed by an erratic drop in birth rates (Kiser and Whelpton 1953) . The fertility development in East Germany after unification is another example (Witte and Wagner 1995; Huinink and Kreyenfeld 2005) . It is unclear, though, if historically exceptional situations of this kind can be generalized. On the micro-level, some studies have addressed the role of unemployment in fertility (Hoem 2000; Santow and Bracher 2001; Kravdal 2002; Vikat 2004; Kurz et al. 2005) . Some other studies have investigated how fertility intentions are influenced by subjective indicators of economic uncertainties (Kohler and Kohler 2002; Speder and Vikat 2005) .
However, hardly any study exists that deals with the impact of subjective measures of economic uncertainty on fertility behavior. That there is little micro-level evidence for the uncertainty-fertility nexus can particularly be attributed to the strong demand on data quality. In order to study how an insecure economic situation affects subsequent childbearing, one requires longitudinal data on fertility, attitudes and employment. Such data is rarely available.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the role of economic uncertainties in first birth decisions in Germany using event history techniques. We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) which provides longitudinal information on fertility, labor market characteristics and attitudes for the period 1984 to 2004. We employ 'objective' measures of uncertainty (unemployment, fixed-term contract, low income) as well as 'subjective' measures (the feeling that the personal economic situation is insecure). A major focus of our analysis is on how the effect of economic uncertainty differs by socioeconomic characteristics. Since the SOEP is one of the largest and longest panels in Europe, it provides sufficient sample size for such kind of analysis. The paper is structured as follows: In the following part, we develop our main research hypotheses. Section 3 reviews empirical studies which deal with the uncertainty and fertility nexus.
Section 4 gives an overview on data and methods. Section 5 presents the empirical results.
Theoretical approaches to economic uncertainty and fertility

Classical fertility theories and the economic foundation of parenthood
There is a long tradition in fertility research which is rooted in the idea that family formation requires a secure economic foundation. In his famous 'essay on population' from 1798, Malthus claimed that food supply and population growth were closely interrelated. Although Malthus believed that the chief mechanisms that balanced food supply and population growth were starvation, death and poverty, he nevertheless posited that economic hardship might induce people to delay marriage and fertility. The idea that family formation requires an adequate economic underpinning has also shaped social institutions. The 'western European marriage pattern' of high percentages of never married persons was directly linked to social norms which excluded unskilled laborers from the rights to get married (Hajnal 1965) . When children were expected to only occur within marriage, such regulations were efficient means to limit fertility of those unable to support a family by their own means.
The idea that economic conditions and fertility are related was severely challenged by the demographic developments widely known as Europe's first demographic transition, when industrialization and economic growth was accompanied by rapid fertility decline. Although it is still disputed what the main courses of the decline of fertility are, it is clear that it is somewhat related to reduced benefits of children (particularly for old age security), a more conscious control of (marital) fertility, as well as to changes in the values parents attach to their off-springs (Coale 1973; Ariès 1980; Hirschman 1994) . What followed was a situation where income and wealth were linked with low rather than high fertility.
The observation that wealthier persons more strongly limited their fertility called for new theoretical approaches. Researchers such as Brentano (1910 : 588), Mombert (1912 or Mackenroth (1953: 397ff.) speculated about an inverse impact of children on social mobility. Leibenstein (1975) and Easterlin (1976) drew on concepts of a 'relative income' to explain variations in fertility. The path-breaking work in this context was, however, developed by Gary S. Becker (1960) . Becker argued that parents do not only choose the number of children (child quantity). They also choose how much time and money they devote to each child (child quality). Becker (1993) assumes that with increasing income the demand for child quality increases disproportionately to child quantity. This produces an inverse relationship between income and fertility.
Women in the focus of contemporary fertility theories
Since the 1970s, the interest in fertility theory has shifted again. Dirk van de Kaa and Ron
Lesthaghe have presumably become the most important proponents in fertility theory.
They observe a fundamental change of values which has swept from northern to southern Europe and triggered a fertility decline known as 'Europe's second demographic transition'. Individualization, self-actualization, individual freedom and women's emancipation range prominently in their theory on fertility decline (van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaghe 1995) . The labor market development or economic uncertainties are merely considered to have a short-term impact on fertility in this conceptual framework.
Economic fertility theories (in shape of the 'New Home Economics') provided a theoretical framework which puts women's employment in the focus of attention (Schultz 1974) . Key assumptions of this framework are that women are chiefly responsible for childrearing and men act as providers of the household income. These things given, an increase in female employment suppresses fertility. In this framework, the increase in women's engagement in education and employment is the prime cause of the decline in fertility in developed countries (Becker 1993: 140; Butz and Ward 1979; Hotz, Klerman and Willis 1997: 298ff.) .
The 1960s and 1970s mark an era where public childcare was not available yet and fathers were rarely involved in childrearing tasks. One of the most significant social changes of this time was the 'new role of women in society'. Since female emancipation and the increase in female employment coincided with a drop in fertility, it seemed only obvious to causally relate the two. The usefulness of this concept for studying the fertility development in contemporary countries has, however, been questioned recently. It has been pointed out that female employment and family life have in many countries become more compatible through public and private day care arrangements (Rindfuss et al. 1996; McDonald 2000) . It has also been argued that fertility research has been too preoccupied by women's labor market behavior. Only little attention has been paid to the deteriorating labor market performance of the 'male breadwinner' in fertility and marriage decisions (Oppenheimer et al. 1988; Oppenheimer 2003 The basic proposition behind this argumentation is that responsible parents will have children, when they are able to support a family. Since children are long-term commitments, it is not only the current economic situation that matters for fertility, but also expectation about the future situation. What still remains unclear in this discussion is whether these uncertainties refer to uncertainties in male employment careers, in female employment careers, or in both. While previous theoretical concepts have been preoccupied with the idea that women's career orientation is the major force behind the fertility decline, new approaches to the role of economic uncertainty stay surprisingly mute about gender roles.
Gender roles and economic uncertainty
In economic theory, a standard hypothesis has been the 'male breadwinner assumption' where the woman is responsible for childrearing tasks and the man for providing the household income. In this regime, insecurities in male employment should induce couples to postpone fertility plans. Since women are expected to be care-givers, labor market developments which discourage them from engaging in an own employment career should only be beneficial for fertility developments. In that sense, insecurities in female employment careers should rather encourage parenthood.
Another more radical twist of the same argument is the work by Friedman, Hechter and Kanazawa (1994: 383ff. Women who consider an insecure employment situation as a suitable basis for family formation will presumably rely on partner income or on public transfers for the subsequent life course.
These considerations nevertheless suggest that there is no universal impact of uncertainty on fertility, particularly with respect to insecurities in female employment. On the one hand, women with restricted options in the labor market might accommodate themselves more readily with the role of mothers (either as single mothers or as dependent housewives). This group of women might particularly perceive precarious employment as a suitable situation to opt for parenthood. On the other hand, highly educated and career oriented educated women will more often consider economic independence as a prerequisite for family formation. They are presumably more reluctant to rely on partner income (or on public transfers) and will delay fertility decisions when they themselves are subject to an insecure labor market situation.
3 Empirical studies on the fertility-uncertainty nexus
How economic uncertainty impacts fertility
Historical demographic literature contains numerous studies which provide evidence for a causal relationship between economic conditions and demographic behavior. For countries which followed the 'western European marriage pattern', it can be shown that economic crisis and hardships had a direct impact on nuptiality and fertility patterns (Lynch 1986; Friedlander 1992) . For the post-industrialization area, there is much fewer evidence of this kind. One of the first micro-level studies which have dealt with the role of economic uncertainty in fertility is presumably the 'Indianapolis Study' (Kiser and Whelpton 1953) . This study was prompted by the concern about low birth rates that followed the Great Depression in the US. However, the Indianapolis Study did not provide particularly strong evidence for the hypothesis that economic uncertainty causes low fertility rates. It might have been these discouraging results, but also the fact that many countries experienced a fertility boom during the 1950s, that caused researchers to loose interest in the relationship between low birth rates and economic uncertainty.
Since then, the favorite variable in micro-level fertility models has been women's career orientation, frequently measured by female education. Event history type models have mostly used education as a time-varying covariate, which distinguishes educational level and educational enrolment. These models generally show that educational enrolment strongly reduces first birth risks. However, after controlling for educational enrolment, no strong independent effect of educational level is usually found (Hoem 1986; Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Kravdal 1994; Liefbroer and Corijn 1999; Kreyenfeld 2004; Lappegård and Rønsen 2004) . Some more recent studies have also addressed how female unemployment or income relates to fertility. These studies only provide equivocal results (Hoem 2000; Santow and Bracher 2001; Kravdal 2002; Meron and Widmer 2002; Kieffer et al. 2005) . Vikat (2004) shows that unemployment delays family formation among highly educated women in Finland. For other educational groups, unemployment fosters family formation. For Sweden, Andersson (2000) shows, for example, that a low female income delays fertility.
Male characteristics have only rarely been considered in empirical micro-level analysis. This certainly pertains to fertility data which have mostly been collected for female respondents only. Studies which contain complete fertility histories of male respondents show that a low wage and a low educational attainment negatively influence first birth risks in Germany (Huinink 1995; Tölke and Diewald 2003) . Household panels that survey the characteristics of all household members also allow for controlling for partner characteristics. The disadvantage of this data set up is that one only observes the partner's characteristics after he has moved in with the female respondent. Regarding first birth, there is every reason to believe that a selection mechanism operates at this threshold already. Males who are disadvantaged in the labor market are also disadvantaged in the partner market.
As to the role of subjective measure of economic uncertainty in fertility, only few studies exist. In order to investigate how subjective measures of economic security impacts fertility, one requires longitudinal information on both subjective indicators as well as respondent's fertility behavior. There are some cross-sectional studies which have analyzed the role of economic uncertainties for fertility intentions (Kohler and Kohler 2002; Speder and Vikat 2005) . However, only few studies have addressed the role of subjective measures of economic uncertainty for real behavior. Exceptions are, for example, the studies by Witte and Wagner (1995) or by Bhaumik and Nugent (2002) .
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, they investigate whether East
German respondents who were particularly worried at unification were less likely to opt for parenthood in the subsequent years. Their investigation provides, however, only equivocal results.
How children impact life satisfaction and economic worries
While there exists only scarce evidence on how economic insecurity impacts fertility, there is substantial empirical research work on how marriage and fertility impacts life satisfaction. Kohler, Behrman and Skytthe (2005) use a sample of Danish twins to show that children impact well-being, accounting for unobserved heterogenity. Stutzer and Frey (2003) show with data from the German-Socio-Economic Panel how marriage increases subjective well-being. Holst and Trzcinski (2005) show with the same data set that the arrival of the first child increases life satisfaction. Figure 1 shows similar results of a logistic regression model. One of the dependent variables is a binary variable for being satisfied with life. The other variable is a binary for being very worried about the personal economic situation (for the full model, see Table A1 in the Appendix). The graph shows that the arrival of the first child marks a drastic increase in life satisfaction. Life satisfaction skyrockets with the birth of the first child, hence it quickly levels off thereafter. Surprisingly, economic worries do not seem to increase significantly after childbirth.
Economic worries and life satisfaction will also range prominently in the subsequent analysis of first birth determinants. That subjective well-being is responsive to childbearing has also major implications for the study of first birth risks. It underlines that one needs to correctly take into account the temporal order between attitudes and subsequent childbearing. If one investigates how well-being impacts fertility, attitudes need to be measured clearly before pregnancy. Otherwise one will find a positive correlation between the two factors which will merely be attributed to the fact that the arrival of the first child makes people happy. Source: Estimates from logistic regression model (see Table A1 in the Appendix for details).
Data, method and covariates
In order to investigate how economic uncertainties impact the transition to first birth, we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel ( 
Covariates
One of our key interests in this study is the impact of economic uncertainty on fertility. It is surveyed for all respondents. Furthermore, it is among the few variables that have 1 In order to guarantee, that we avoid reversed causation, we backdate the date of birth by nine month. Therefore, we rather study first pregnancy risks than first birth risks. For improved readability, we refer to 'first birth risks' in the description of the results.
been surveyed every year. Also it is phrased in the same way over the panel waves. 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
Results
Insecurities in female employment careers and fertility postponement
In the following empirical analysis, we investigate how objective and subjective measures of economic uncertainty influence first birth risks. Let us first turn to the control variables. There is a bell-shaped impact of age on first birth risks. The hazards for family formation (or rather first pregnancy) are highest in the age bracket 25 to 28. The age profile is pronounced, but it would be stronger if one had not controlled for the partnership status, which also relates to age. Having a partner who lives in the same household has a distinct and marked impact on first birth risks. A partner increases the transition rate to the first child by the factor 3. Vice versa, having no partner reduces first birth risks by roughly 70 percent. Nationality has a significant impact on first birth risks, with foreigners encountering a first birth risk that is elevated by more than 30 percent. We only find a modest decline in first birth risks since the 1980s. A model that includes only age and calendar period (not presented here) shows a slightly more pronounced impact of the calendar period on first birth risks, suggesting that an increase in female education explains some of the changes in first birth rates over time. The educational level shows a negative and significant gradient. Since educational enrollment is controlled for, this result suggests that the highly educated more strongly postpone parenthood after completion of education.
In line with other studies, we find that first birth risks are particularly low during Woman's gross labor market income does not seem to impact first birth risks, either. A classical expectation on this issue would be that high female wages increase the opportunity costs of childbearing and lower the chances of a first birth for a woman. If one assumes, however, that particularly highly educated women are able to resolve the incompatibility between childrearing and employment, the situation is less clear-cut. In that case, one could argue that highly educated women postpone childbearing until they have reached a high income. In essence, wages depend on age as well as on educational attainment. The interrelation between wage, age and income is not sufficiently addressed in a model which treats education, income and age as variables that have an independent impact on first birth risks. We will come back to this issue in the subsequent analysis.
Model 4 includes the variable that indicates whether the personal economic situation is insecure, Model 5 the variable that indicates general life satisfaction. None of these indicators suggest that there is any impact of subjective measures of economic uncertainty on first birth fertility in western Germany. The quintessence of this is that neither the objective measures of economic uncertainty (fixed term contract, unemployment, a low labor market income) nor the subjective measures of economic uncertainty are related to first birth risks, neither in a positive nor in a negative manner. 
5.2
The differential effect of economic uncertainty on family formation
Following our theoretical presumptions, the impact of economic uncertainty should vary by women's career orientation. Women who can accommodate themselves with the role of housewives might not be particularly affected in their fertility plans by own labor market insecurities. Only women who consider economic independence as a prerequisite for family formation will delay parenthood, if they feel that the personal economic situation is insecure. Women with a higher education can generally expect to receive higher wages. It also seems reasonable to assume that, if female economic independence is a prerequisite for family formation, it is a matter for the highly educated. In order to address how insecurities vary by women's career orientation, we interact indicators of economic uncertainty with the woman's educational level. For the type of work contract, there were too few cases available, which is why we did not perform any interactions with this variable. Table 2 reports an interaction of education and employment status. For this interaction, we had to group women employed part-time and full-time into one category to provide a sufficiently high sample size. There is clear-cut evidence with respect to the effect of educational participation. For all educational categories, educational enrolment lowers first birth risks significantly. Employment also has a similar impact across all educational levels. The great difference lies in the impact of unemployment. For highly educated women, first birth risks are significantly reduced if they are unemployed.
Compared to employed women with a high educational level, their unemployed counterparts experience a first birth risks that is reduced by 60 percent. 4 For women with a medium educational level, we do not find much of an impact of unemployment on fertility rates. For women with a low educational level, however, unemployment seems to increase the transition rate to the first child. Compared to employed women with a low educational level, first birth risks are elevated by 25 percent for their unemployed counterparts.
4
The relative risk of being unemployed for the highly educated is calculated by dividing the relative risks of unemployment (0.38) by the relative risks of employment (0.95), which equals 0.4. First birth risks are therefore lowered by 60 percent (1-0.4)*100). Table 3 and Table 4 provide the interaction of the subjective measures of economic uncertainty and educational level. It supports the presumption that economic worries particularly impact first birth risks among the highly educated. For women with a low educational level, the effect is rather vice versa. For example, first birth risks of women with an 'Abitur' are reduced by roughly 40 percent if they are worried about their personal economic situation (compared to being not worried). For women with a low educational level, first birth risks increase by 13 percent if they are very worried. For life satisfaction, the pattern is similar in the sense that a low life satisfaction seems only to prevent more highly educated women from having children. Low scores on life satisfaction strongly discourage highly educated women from having children. Lowly educated women with a low life satisfaction seem to be particularly amenable to the idea of parenthood. Table 5 reports the interaction of education and monthly gross income. As in the previous analysis, we only consider the wages of the full-time employed. If the assumption is correct that highly educated women seek a secure economic position to have children, one would expect that low wages will defer their fertility plans. One finds rather modest support for this presumption. Women with an 'Abitur' and an income of more than 5000
Euro encounter elevated first birth risks. Since this category is rather small, it is not surprising that these results are insignificant. The income-fertility nexus is, complicated by the fact that educational level and income are closely intervened. This becomes very obvious when one considers that the combination 'low educational level' and 'income of more than 5000 Euro'. We cannot provide estimates for this combination, since there are too few cases with such characteristics. 
Insecurities in the partner's employment careers and fertility postponement
While it might not come as a surprise that insecurities in female employment careers have an ambivalent impact on fertility, there should be less ambiguities with respect to the role of insecurities in male employment. In most countries, and in western Germany in particular, the male breadwinner model is the dominant living arrangement of families.
Mother's employment rates differ by educational level, but nevertheless, women strongly reduce their employment after childbirth. Even in the year 2002, only about a quarter of West German women with children below age 3 are employed (Geisler and Kreyenfeld 2005) . If they work, they rarely engage in full-time employment. Against this background, one would expect that particularly insecurities in male employment make couples postpone their fertility plans.
In order to address this issue empirically, we estimate several event history models where we control for the partner's characteristics. For this investigation, we only have the partner's characteristics for the time he is co-residing with the female respondent. This limits our analysis to the segments in women's lives when they have partners. This also means that one disregards births that occur outside of a (cohabiting) union. Since, one could assume that female and male characteristics are somewhat related, we first estimate models which only includes partner's characteristics. The last model then also includes female employment status and education. Table 6 presents the results. Somewhat surprisingly, male educational attainment has a negative (but insignificant) impact on first birth rates. In general, one could expect that more highly educated males have high income and therefore better chances of setting up a family early in life. That we do not find this positive gradient might point to several aspects. One explanation could be that we only take into account the male's characteristics after entry into a co-residential union. Since less educated males are disadvantaged on the partner market, the analysis is selective in respect to partner characteristics. The results could also relate to educational homogamy. Men with a high 'earning potential' often live with women who have similar characteristics. Although the man might have the earning potential to support a family, the female partner's career ambition (and the incompatibility of it with childrearing) works in the opposite direction.
One would be able to resolve this issue if one accounted for female characteristics. After controlling for female education and employment (Model 4), the coefficient for male education indeed increases slightly. However, it does not become positive, which one would expect if male earning potentials played indeed such a strong role in fertility, as it is often predicted. A very likely explanation seems to be that more highly educated men invest more in their career development during which they refrain from fatherhood. This would indicate that incompatibilities between career advancement and fertility also exist for males.
Similar to female educational participation, male educational participation suppresses the likelihood of parenthood. First birth risks are reduced by roughly 25 percent if the partner is receiving education or is doing his military service. This impact seems less strong than for female educational participation (, in the previous analysis, we
showed that woman's educational participation reduces first birth risks by 60 percent).
One needs to consider, though, that we only take into account periods when males are in a union. This substantially reduces the time of exposure in education for the male partner's characteristics.
Surprisingly, male employment status does not have the expected strong impact on first birth risks. Unemployment does not seem to have an impact on first birth risks at all. Only after controlling for female characteristics does male unemployment show the expected sign, in the sense that it reduces first birth risks. A similar matter applies to the impact of an unlimited working contract that has no impact on first birth risks. There is a somewhat positive impact of income on fertility. Compared to a high monthly income (3000-5000 Euro), a very high income (more than 5000 Euro) increases first birth risks by 25 percent. Apart from this pronounced impact of a very high income on fertility, the other income groups do not differ significantly. The relationship between male income and fertility is complicated by the close interrelation between age, education and income.
One can, nevertheless, asses that the monthly income of the male partner does not seem to be such a powerful and straightforward predictor for first birth risks than one would expect to be the case in a 'male breadwinner regime'. 
Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to investigate how economic uncertainty induces fertility delay. Fertility theory has been rooted in the idea that fertility decisions require a secure economic foundation, which was usually considered to be an adequate, secure employment position of the 'male breadwinner'. Female employment was often approached via the 'opportunity cost argument' in which the labor market participation of women suppresses fertility. In this framework, women's employment and career orientation is the greatest threat to a country's reproductive level. Vice versa, low female wages, high female unemployment and bad employment chances for women should only be beneficial for high birth rates.
A standard assumption behind this thinking is that women are unable to bring in synch employment and childrearing. Women who are career oriented and emancipated stay childless in this framework. In contemporary societies, the compatibility of childrearing and employment has become somewhat more compatible due to a better access to private and public day care arrangements. Given that a family life and a working career have become more compatible, the more highly educated might not refrain from parenthood altogether. Instead they will try to accommodate the role of workers and mothers. For these women, economic independence and a secure employment situation might be particularly important for having children. It is for these women, that one would expect that labor market uncertainties have the strongest repercussions on their reproductive behavior.
The empirical results of this paper provide an ambivalent view. There is no evidence that insecurities in female employment careers generally impact first birth decisions. There are, however, interaction effects between educational level and economic uncertainties. Unemployment strongly defers fertility plans among the highly educated women. Being worried about the own personal situation has also a very profound impact on fertility behavior of those with higher educational levels. If a woman with an 'Abitur' (high level) feels worried about her personal economic situation or if she is not satisfied with her life as such, she will most likely postpone parenthood. For women with a 'Realschulabschluss' (medium level), the subjective feeling of economic uncertainty plays a rather insignificant role for the decision to have a first child.
It is a striking result that among the lowly educated women, economic uncertainty accelerates fertility decisions. Women with a 'Hauptschulabschluss' or without a school degree are very likely to become pregnant when they are unemployed, when they worry about their personal economic situation or when they are rather unsatisfied with their life as such. This result points to an argument developed by Friedman, Hechter and Kanazawa (1994) who posit that disadvantaged subgroups of the population choose parenthood as a strategy to structure their otherwise uncertain life course.
The empirical results of partner's characteristics gives rather weak support for the hypothesis that couples generally postpone fertility until the male breadwinner has reached a high labor market income or a secure employment situation. After controlling for female characteristics, there is a negative (but insignificant) impact of male unemployment on first birth risks. There is also a pronounced elevated fertility risk for women with partners with an income of more than 5000 Euro. However, the general results on the impact of male labor market uncertainties in the delay in fertility are less straightforward than one would expect to be the case.
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